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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 1996, the President of the United States, Wil-
liam Jefferson Clinton, signed the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity Act (Liberty Act),' one of the most controversial
pieces of legislation the United States has ever adopted. The
provision of the Liberty Act which has caused most of the contro-
versy permits those U.S. nationals whose property was confis-
cated by the Cuban government to sue in U.S. Federal district
courts any person who "traffics" in their confiscated property.2
Since the enactment of the Liberty Act,3 numerous countries
have attacked its validity alleging, inter alia, that it violates in-
ternational law by infringing on the sovereignty of other states.4
As a result, several foreign countries have threatened retaliatory
action against the United States if U.S. nationals attempt to en-
force the provisions of the Liberty Act against the nationals of
those foreign countries.5
On June 4, 1996, the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States (OAS) approved the mandate which in-
structed the Inter-American Juridical Committee (Committee) to
1. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) [hereinafter Liberty Act]. To the best of the author's knowledge Saturnio E. Lucio I first
coined the abbreviation, "Cuban Liberty Act." See Saturnio E. Lucio I, The Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 325, 326
(1996).
2. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302.
3. The Liberty Act is commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act after its two congressional
sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Representative Dan Burton (R-IN).
4. See, e.g., Latin American Leaders Reject Cuba Sanctions as Summit Ends, EMERGING
MARKET REpS., Sept. 4, 1996, available in EMREP 14:24:00; Nick Anderson, Mexican President
Steps Up Attack on U.S. Helms-Burton Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL
4437467; US. Decision on Implementation of Helms-Burton Pleases Neither U.S. Allies Nor Law's
Backers in Congress, NoTISuR-LATiN AM. P0. AFF., July 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8089417.
5. Guy de Jonquieres et a., EU Unites Over US Measures Against Cuba, FIN. TIMES, July 18,
1996, at 4; Julie Wolf& Brian Coleman, EU Plans Strategy to Counter Law in U.S. to Punish Cuba,
Iran Trade, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 31, 1996, at 7; Jeremy Gaunt, Legal Threat of Sanctions on For-
eign Companies Causes Fury, IR. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at 6; Diego Cevalloss, U.S. Alone in Zeal to
Apply Helms-Burton Law Against Cuba, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11625094.
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examine the Liberty Act and to decide its validity under inter-
national law. 6 The Committee made several findings including
that the Liberty Act: 1) transformed a claim for expropriation or
confiscation, which is generally viewed as a state-to-state claim
under international law, into a domestic legal claim under inter-
nal or municipal law by a U.S. national against a national of a
foreign state; 2) conferred the right to make such claims on per-
sons, including Cuban citizens, who were not U.S. nationals at
the time of the confiscation of property; 3) attributed the re-
sponsibility for the acts of a foreign state to private nationals of
that state; 4) valuated compensation for the loss of the confis-
cated property in a way which could result in treble damages; 5)
determined the damages as the total value of the confiscated
property, without considering the value of the benefit derived by
the person from the use of the property or the claimed loss to the
original owner by its use; 6) allowed claims against foreign na-
tionals without providing them with effective means to refute or
contest the allegations against them, including the issues of
ownership and amount of damages, particularly those deter-
mined by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(Commission); 7) confused a claim for damages or restitution,
based on naturalization or expropriation, with an action in rem
to claim confiscated property or an action in personam for unjust
enrichment from the use of such property by any person subse-
quently involved with the property; and, finally, 8) created liabil-
ity for foreign nationals who lawfully use expropriated property
in the territory of the expropriating state.7 The Committee held
that the Liberty Act has "significant areas" which are "not in
conformity with international law."8
This Comment examines whether the Committee correctly
applied international law to the provisions of the Liberty Act'
which allow U.S. nationals to sue for money damages any per-
son, including a foreigner or foreign company, which buys,
leases, derives benefit from, or otherwise traffics in property
which the Cuban government confiscated from U.S. nationals.
The decision, although not binding,9 hampers U.S. efforts to
6. Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Resolution AG/DOC. 33 75/96, Free-
dom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, CJI/RES.ll-14/96, 8-9 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter
Committee's Decision].
7. Id. at 4-5.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id at 3.
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gather international support for tougher sanctions against Cuba.
This Comment argues the Liberty Act essentially functions
as a sanction on Cuba by discouraging foreign investment in
confiscated property which provides Cuba with badly needed
economic aid. The Liberty Act's deterrent effect against eco-
nomic investment in Cuba, rationally based on a person's fear of
incurring liability, is undermined by decisions such as the
Committee's that questions the Act's validity under international
law. The decision ultimately affects the willingness of many
countries to openly support the Liberty Act because these coun-
tries may not wish to support an act which many in the interna-
tional community consider to be contrary to international law.
In the worst case scenario for the United States, the decision will
serve as a justification in the eyes of the world for retaliatory
action against the United States by those countries whose na-
tionals are affected. The final result may be interference with
the Act's stated, if not impossible, goal: to bring democratic free-
dom and prosperity to the Cuban people.' 0
Part II of this Comment looks at the rights and require-
ments of the Liberty Act, and illustrates its impact with an
authentic example. Review of the history of the Liberty Act and
the events leading to the Committee's decision is provided in
Part III. Part IV analyzes the rationale the Committee employed
in reaching its decision and examines the reasons advanced to
reject the pertinent provisions of the Liberty Act under custom-
ary public international law. Finally, this Comment concludes
with a summary in response to the validity of both the Liberty
Act and the Committee's decision.
II. THE LIBERTY ACT IN THEORY
The Liberty Act imposes civil liability on persons who
"traffic" in property confiscated from U.S. nationals by the Cu-
ban government and grants the nationals the right to file suit
against "traffickers" for money damages" in federal district
court. 12 Only a U.S. national who is a citizen or a legal entity or-
ganized under U.S. law may sue a person trafficking in confis-
10. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 3(1).
11. Id § 302.
12. Id. § 302(c)(I).
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cated property.' 3 In addition, the Act also gives a U.S. national
who was a citizen of Cuba at the time of the confiscation the
right to bring an action; however, a potential plaintiff must wait
two years from the promulgation of the Act before filing suit
against the trafficking person.14 The Liberty Act's definition of
"person" includes any person, legal entity, or foreign national. 15
The Act defines the term foreign nationals as either an alien or a
juridical entity, such as a corporation or partnership not organ-
ized under U.S. law. 16
In order for a person to incur civil liability and to expose
themselves to a possible suit by a U.S. national, they must
knowingly traffic in property confiscated from a U.S. national.
17
The Liberty Act defines trafficking broadly. The definition in-
cludes a person who knowingly and intentionally sells, pur-
chases, or leases confiscated property or who benefits or profits
from the trafficking of the property. 18 Actual or constructive
knowledge that they are trafficking in property confiscated from
a U.S. national is required under the Act. 19 Confiscated property
includes real, personal, or mixed property, which has been na-
tionalized, expropriated, or seized by the Cuban government
without the return of the property, payment of adequate and ef-
fective compensation, or the settlement of the claim to the prop-
erty by an international agreement. 20 Confiscated property does
not, however, include real property presently in use for residen-
tial purposes, unless the U.S. national's claim has been certified
by the Commission under the International Settlement Act of
1949 or the property is occupied by a Cuban government official
or ruling political party.2 1
13. Id. § 4(15).
14. Id. § 302(a)(5)(C).
15. Id. § 4(8), (11).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 302.
18. Id. § 4(13).
19. Id. § 4(9).
20. Id. § 4(4), (12). Debate exists over the differences between confiscation, expro-
priation, nationalization, and seizure. For debate of these terms, see Frances H. Foster,
Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 651-52 (1996). For the purposes of this Comment, the terms are used
interchangeably and given the definition provided by the Liberty Act, except where a dif-
ferent analysis flows from the use of a particular term.
21. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 4(12)(B).
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As stated previously, U.S. nationals may bring an action
against a person trafficking in confiscated property in U.S. dis-
trict court. 22 All procedural requirements applicable to a federal
question action under Section 1331 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code
apply to an action brought under the Liberty Act. 23 In addition,
service of process is made in accordance with Section 1608 of Ti-
tle 28.24
The money damages for which a U.S. national may sue un-
der this Act are calculated using one of three methods, with the
greatest amount being adopted.25 The first method of calculation
is the amount of damages, plus interest, certified by the Com-
mission under the International Settlement Act of 1949.26 If no
claim was filed with the Commission, the court may appoint a
special master to determine the amount of the claim, plus inter-
est.27 This determination, however, is not conclusive and serves
only an evidentiary purpose. 28 The final method of calculation is
the fair market value of the property, determined as the greater
of the current value of the property or the value of the property
at the time of confiscation, plus interest from that date. 29 The
Liberty Act trebles the amount of the foregoing damages when a
person traffics in confiscated property certified under the Com-
mission 3 or where the trafficker is given notice by a U.S. na-
tional of the national's intent to bring an action under the Lib-
erty Act and the trafficker ignores a demand to cease the
trafficking of the confiscated property. 3'
On July 16, 1996,32 January 3, 1997, 33 and again on July 10,
22. Id. § 302(c)(1).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 302(c)(2).
25. Id § 302(a)(l)(A)(i)(1)-(Il).
26. Id. § 302(a)(1)(A)(i)(1); 22 U.S.C.A. § 1643(b).
27. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(I)(A)(i)(II).
28. Id. § 303(a)(2).
29. Id. § 302(a)(1)(A)(i)(llI).
30. Id. § 302(a)(3)(A).
31. Id. § 302(a)(3)(B).
32. White House Special Briefing Subject: Presidential Decision on Title III of the Cuban Lib-
erty and Democratic Solidarity Act, FED. NEWS SERv., July 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5794619;
David L. Rabin, Clinton Couldn't Decide Where to Jump, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at A17.
33. President Clinton Statement on Helms Burton, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 3, 1997, available in
1996 WL 5710104. President Clinton has stated he will continue to postpone the implementation of
Title 11 as long as U.S. allies in the international community continue their efforts to bring democracy
to Cuba. Id
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1997,34 President Clinton exercised the option under the Liberty
Act that allows the President to suspend the implementation of
Title III for six months,3 5 presumably in an attempt to ease ten-
sions with complaining countries.8 6 Unfortunately, this suspen-
sion also delayed what will undoubtedly be a fascinating analysis
of the first action filed under the Act and an examination of the
possible problems in its implementation.
The impact of the Liberty Act can best be understood
through the use of an illustration based on the author's own per-
sonal experience with the Cuban confiscation of his father's
property and that of his grandfather's. The author's father, who
for the purposes of this example will simply be referred to as
"Father," fled from Cuba to Miami, Florida in 1960, shortly after
Fidel Castro's rise to power. Father's property, consisting of
farm land and surrounding buildings, remained in grandfather's
possession for some time, but was eventually confiscated by the
Cuban government. 37 The property at the time of confiscation
had a fair market value of $75,000. Subsequently, Father be-
came a U.S. citizen and continues to reside in Miami today. The
confiscated farm land and buildings have reportedly been sold to
a foreign company, which built a factory on the land and is cur-
rently conducting business there. Although not organized under
U.S. laws, the foreign company has offices and conducts business
in the United States. The property has a current value of
$100,000. Thus, the issue is whether the Liberty Act offers Fa-
ther any recourse.
Father was not a U.S. citizen at the time of the confiscation
of grandfather's property, so, as a preliminary matter, he would
have to wait two years from the date of the Act's implementation
before filing suit.38 Once the two years have passed, and barring
any further delay by the President, Father can file suit in U.S.
34. William E. Gibson, Clinton Blocks Cuba Lawsuits Suspension Leads to Protest from GOP
Legislators, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), July 17, 1997, at 12A; Clinton Uses Waiver to Block
Helms-Burton Law, HOUSTON CHRON., July 17, 1997, at 22.
35. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 306(b)(1). Liability for trafficking in confiscated property has
accrued from November 1, 1996, and is not tolled. White House Special Briefing Subject: Presidential
Decision on Title Iff of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, FED. NEWS SERV., July 16,
1996, available in 1996 WL 5794619.
36. Rabin, supra note 32, at A17.
37. Although the illustration is true, the exact details, including the value of the property and
who "owns" it today, are unknown.
38. See Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(5)(C). This amount in controversy requirement has
been met in Father's case.
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district court against the foreign company currently in posses-
sion of the property, provided the company is amenable to serv-
ice and suit under personal jurisdiction and Father's claim ex-
ceeds the federal amount in controversy requirements of subject
matter jurisdiction.3 9 Father was unable to file a claim with the
Commission because he was not a U.S. citizen at the time of the
confiscation, so he may sue for the amount determined by a spe-
cial master, if appointed by the court, or the fair market value of
the property, whichever is greater. 40 Father must prove owner-
ship of the property, presumably as an heir, and must also sub-
mit evidence proving the current value of $100,000, which is the
greater of the two amounts in the example. 4 1 Father may even
sue for triple the current value of the property if he gives notice
to the foreign company of his intent to sue, and the company
continues to traffic in the property. 42 The foreign company may
contest the claim and also has the right to submit evidence
tending to disprove either Father's ownership or the amount of
damages.4 3
The district court will apply the Liberty Act to the facts of
the case and will make a determination. Either party may ap-
peal the district court's judgment in the same way they would
any other federal judgment entered against them." In theory,
this is the way the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
should work.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE LIBERTY ACT
The Liberty Act condemns the Cuban government's attack
on two American civilian planes and states that the incident ex-
posed Cuban dictator Fidel Castro's disregard for international
law.4 5 The American planes were owned and operated by Broth-
ers-to-the-Rescue, a humanitarian group that flies over the
Florida Straits searching for Cuban rafters attempting to reach
the United States.4 6 On February 24, 1996, three unarmed
39. See id. § 302(c)(1).
40. See id §§ 302(a)(l)(A)(i)()-(11), 303(a)(2).
41. See id
42. See id § 302(a)3)(B).
43. See id. §§ 303(c)(2),(3), 302(c)(I)-(2).
44. See id. § 302(c)(1).
45. Id § 116.
46. Id. § 116(a)(1); Larry Rohter, Exiles Say Cuba Downed 2 Planes and Clinton Expresses
710 [Vol. 28:3
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Brothers-to-the-Rescue planes flew over international waters
north of the Cuban coast when two of the planes were shot down
by a Cuban jet.47 All four U.S. citizens in the planes were
killed.48 This international incident gave the Liberty Act the
support it needed to pass in both the House and Senate of the
U.S. Congress 49 and reportedly led President Clinton to sign the
Act into law on March 12, 1996.50 Ironically, before the incident,
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher recommended that
the President veto the bill as then presented.51 Perhaps as a re-
sult of the Clinton administration's change of mind, the Liberty
Act immediately drew criticism from the international commu-
nity. As previously stated, several countries, particularly Mex-
ico, Canada and those in the European Union, allege that the bill
violates many provisions of international law. 52 Allegations
quickly turned into threats of retaliatory legislation, open trade
war, and actions against the United States in international tri-
bunals.5 3
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, § 1, at 3; Mireya Navarro, Pilots' Group, Firm Foe of Castro,
Ignored Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at Al.
47. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 116(a)(2)-(8); Rohter, supra note 46; Navarro, supra note 46.
48. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 116(12); Rohter, supra note 46; Navarro, supra note 46.
49. U.S. State Department Spokesperson Nicholas Burns Holds Daily Briefing (CNN Television
Broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996).
50. Id.; James Rosen, Clinton, Helms at Odds With Allies Over Cuban Sanctions, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Mar. 12, 1996, at Al; Stephen Fidler, The Long Arm of American Law:
US. Legislation Aimed at Punishing Fidel Castro Has Angered Washington's Trading Partners and
Left Mr. Clinton With a Dilemna, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1996, at 17.
51. Tom Carter, House Votes to Tighten Cuba Net; Embargo Bill Wins Veto-Proof Backing,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at Al.
52. See, e.g., Latin American Leaders Reject Cuba Sanctions as Summit Ends, supra note 4;
Anderson, supra note 4; U.S. Decision on Implementation of Helms-Burton Pleases Neither US. Allies
Nor Law's Backers in Congress, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. PC. AFF., July 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8089417. With the possible exception of Israel and Uzbekistan, the United States has virtually no sup-
port for the Liberty Act in the international community. U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas
Burns Holds Daily Briefing (CNN Television Broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996).
53. Jonquieres, supra note 5 at 4; Wolf& Coleman, supra note 5 at 7; Gaunt, supra note 5. The
European Union, in particular, requested that the World Trade Organization (WTO) form a panel to
examine the validity of the Liberty Act. Gustavo Capdevilla, WTO Takes United States to Trial Over
Helms-Burton, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13589298. The WTO
agreed and now has six months to produce its findings. The United States has refused to attend the
WTO panel and maintains that the WTO is not the proper tribunal to deal with such an issue because
the European Union's problems with the Liberty Act are "a matter of U.S. national security and foreign
policy" and, thus, not a trade issue to be handled by the WTO. Id. U.S. Vows to Boycott Tribunal
Over Cuba Europeans Protest Helm Burton Act, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Feb. 21, 1997,
at Al; see also U.S. State Department Spokesperson Nicholas Burns Holds Daily Briefing (CNN
Television Broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996).
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The United States attempted to ease tensions and draw
support for the newly promulgated Act by sending special repre-
sentative Stuart Eizenstat to Mexico to meet with government
officials and business leaders, but despite the Act's stated pur-
pose of bringing democracy to Cuba, Eizenstat found only harsh
criticism and more threats.5 4 Mexico has openly opposed U.S.
policy against Cuba in the past and continues to oppose any
blockade or other measure against the country with whom it
shares good commercial and diplomatic relations. 5 One journal-
ist suggests the reason for the furious reaction to the Liberty Act
is that preliminary reports indicate the Act is already having a
deterrent effect on investment in confiscated property.56 Can-
ada's ambassador to Cuba, Mark Entwistle, and even Cuban
Vice President Carlos Lage, among others, admit the Liberty Act
is having a "significant chilling effect" on investment decisions in
Cuba. 57 The number of entrepreneurs going to Cuba and seeking
investment opportunities has reportedly declined because of fear
of incurring liability under the Act.58
Until the Committee's decision, the allegations, threats, and
criticisms against the Liberty Act were unsupported by any legal
opinion from international governmental or quasi-governmental
organizations. Finally, on June 4, 1996, during a session entitled
"Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere," the Gen-
eral Assembly of the OAS instructed its Committee to examine
the Liberty Act and determine its validity under international
law.59 The decision by the Committee that the Liberty Act does
not conform to international law is not binding on the United
States in any international tribunal.6 0 However, the decision's
effect is measured in the strength it gives to allegations that the
Liberty Act violates international law and the support and it
54. U.S. Alone in Zeal to Apply Helms-Burton Law Against Cuba, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug.
29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11625094. The criticism was so severe that Special Representative
Eizenstat canceled a lunch with Mexican legislators and continued on to Canada and the European
Union. Id.
55. Id.
56. Tom Carter, U.S. Law Succeeds in Hurting Cuba; Companies Reconsider Investments,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6,1996, at A10.
57. Id
58. Id; see also Cuba Says New US. Legislation has Already Hurt, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
59. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 3.
60. Id
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provides for retaliatory action against the United States.61 The
Committee based its opinion on several principles of public in-
ternational law as defined in Article 38, Paragraph 162 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 68
IV. THE DECISION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL
COMMITTEE
A. The Protection of Property Rights of Nationals
Under International Law
The Committee concluded that the Liberty Act's protection
of the property rights of U.S. nationals violated international law
in several areas. 64 A careful review of the conclusions reached by
the Committee requires the observation, at the outset, that in-
ternational law recognizes a presumption against the existence
of a conflict between municipal and international law. 65 This
presumption stems from the notion that since international law
is, for the most part, based on the "common consent" of coun-
tries, no state would purposefully enact a municipal law that
conflicts with international law. 66 Thus, municipal laws should
be interpreted in a manner that would avoid any conflict with in-
ternational law.67 However, a municipal law contrary to inter-
national law is inapplicable with respect to other states whose
61. Anderson, supra note 4; US envoy to Mexico, Canada, Havana, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Aug. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3914556.
62. Article 38, Paragraph 1 provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
63. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 4.
64. Id. at 8.
65. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 81 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
66. Id. at 81-82.
67. Id. at 82.
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rights and obligations are first derived from international law.
Such states may disregard the municipal law "to the extent of its
conflict with international law."68 With these principles in mind,
the Committee's several conclusions are discussed below.
1. Domestic Courts as International Forums
The Committee first concludes that the domestic courts of a
claimant state are not the proper forum for the resolution of
state-to-state claims. 6 9 Thus, under this rationale, a U.S. na-
tional with a claim for expropriation or confiscation may not
bring his claim in the courts of the United States under the Lib-
erty Act, but rather, the United States must bring an action on
the national's behalf in an international tribunal.
A thorough discussion of whether a claim for expropriation
or confiscation is exclusively a state-to-state claim to be brought
before an international tribunal solely by the espousing state on
behalf of one of its nationals is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment; however, it should be mentioned that expropriation claims
historically have been brought before international tribunals by
an espousing state, reinforcing the notion that states are the
only proper parties in international law actions. 70 At the same
time, this historical general rule of state espousal is in decline. 7'
Oppenheim notes that "the increasing role of individuals as sub-
jects of international law," among other things, "ha[s] tended to
make the distinction between international law and national law
less clear and more complex than was formerly supposed at a
time when the field of application of international law could be
regarded as solely the relations of states among themselves." 72
The distinction between international law and municipal
law becomes less important when compared to the practical
problems that arise when a state attempts to apply rules of in-
ternational law within its municipal system and when there is a
conflict between a rule of international law and an internal law
68. Id. at 84.
69. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 6.
70. Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the
International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 494 (1991).
71. Id.
72. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 54.
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of the state, 73 as in the present case. Oppenheim answers these
questions by surveying the practice of several states and con-
cludes that rules of international law do often operate as part of
municipal law, but not all the time.74 International law depends
on the state municipal systems of law for the enforcement and
application of international law and leaves to these systems the
precise method for the obedience of the law. 75
Such is the case with the Liberty Act. The United States
may not always apply rules of international law to municipal
law, but by enacting the Liberty Act, it has essentially adopted
the historically international claim of expropriation or confisca-
tion into its municipal system, at least to the extent of the Cuban
expropriations.7 6 A survey of the national laws of various coun-
tries support the notion that such an adoption is entirely within
the confines of customary public international law.7 7 This of
course does not answer the question whether municipal law
should apply rules of international law, in lieu of international
tribunals. The general rule, if there is one under international
law, is that a person who cannot recover their expropriated
property in the country of expropriation may recover their prop-
erty elsewhere.78 In the case of expropriation or confiscation, at
least, the author proposes a balancing test between the adequacy
of remedies, or lack thereof, in international tribunals and the
possible remedies under municipal law, with the ultimate goal of
reaching an equitable result.
Under the current situation, U.S. nationals with expropria-
tion claims do not have adequate remedies against Cuba di-
rectly. 79 Cuba has shown no interest in either returning the
property or effectively compensating U.S. nationals for the con-
fiscation of their property. In fact, it is offering the confiscated
property for sale to foreign nationals.80 Moreover, the interna-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (1990).
76. See OPPENHEIm, supra note 65, at 82-83 (discussing the forms in which states "meet their
international obligations," including the "transformation [of international law] into national law by way
of statute"); see also id at 54-55.
77. Id. at 54-59 (examining the operation of international law in the municipal law of various
states, including the United Kingdom).
78. B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (A.D. McNar et al.
eds., 1959).
79. Liberty Act supra note 1, § 301(8).
80. Id. § 301(5).
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tional judicial system lacks adequate remedies for the wrongful
expropriation of or unjust enrichment from confiscated proper-
ties.81 The jurisdiction of international tribunals is consensual, 82
thus, Cuba could effectively deny any remedy to a U.S. national
whose property it confiscated by simply not consenting to the ju-
risdiction of the international forum. Even assuming Cuba con-
sents to jurisdiction, it could be decades before a U.S. national
sees any compensation, which in any case is likely to be an in-
adequate amount when compared to the amount to which the
U.S. national is entitled under international law. 83 Balancing
the inadequacy of international remedies available to U.S. na-
tionals with the remedy of money damages under the Liberty Act
results in the inescapable conclusion that the Act, and the U.S.
municipal legal system, is better suited to remedy the claims of
U.S. nationals whose property has been confiscated by the Cu-
ban government. Notwithstanding the Committee's decision, the
judicial courts of the United States are a proper forum for the
resolution of the expropriation claims of U.S. nationals.
2. The Espousal of the Claims of Non-Nationals
The preceding analysis, however, does not address the
Committee's conclusion that the claimant state has no right to
hear claims by persons who were not its nationals at the time of
expropriation.8 4 Applying the Committee's rationale to the Lib-
erty Act results in the conclusion that international law prohib-
its the United States from allowing its nationals who were Cu-
ban citizens at the time of the confiscation of their property to
sue persons trafficking their property.
Ordinarily, when a private person has suffered an injury, a
state wishing to bring a claim in an international tribunal on be-
half of that person must show that the person was its national at
the time of the injury.85 This is because by "taking up the case of
one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or inter-
national judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality
81. Id. § 301(8). Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with Interna-
tional Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 436-37 (1996).
82. Clagett supra note 81, at 436-37.
83. Id. at 437.
84. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 6.
85. OPPENHEiM, supra note 65, at 512.
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asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its
subject, respect for the rules of international law."86 As a gen-
eral rule, international law leaves it up to the state and its mu-
nicipal law to determine who its nationals are.87 This determi-
nation, however, may not be conclusive evidence of nationality
under international law. 88 The International Court of Justice in
the Nottebohm Case regarded nationality as a legal bond having
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a general connection of
existence and sentiments, together with the existence of recipro-
cal rights and duties.8 9
It bears mentioning that these general principles are not
entirely applicable to the Liberty Act and the remedies it pro-
vides for U.S. nationals who were Cuban citizens at the time of
the confiscation of their property. The foregoing principles ap-
pear to apply exclusively to situations where a state brings a
claim on behalf of its national in an international tribunal or
through diplomatic proceedings. 90 The Liberty Act, on the other
hand, provides a cause of action to U.S. nationals in the district
courts of the United States.9 1 Thus, at least on their face, the
general principles appear inapplicable to the Liberty Act.
The stronger argument, however, is found in the various ex-
ceptions to the general rule that a state may not bring an action
on behalf of persons who were not its nationals at the time of the
confiscation. 92 States have protected the international rights of
persons who are not their nationals by making international
agreements 93 and treaties and, particularly applicable in the
present context, through diplomatic action based on humanitar-
ian concerns on behalf of nonnationals wronged by another
state.9
4
These exceptions have come about primarily in an attempt
to mitigate the problems suffered by stateless or displaced per-
86. id.; see also Norton, supra note 70, at 494.
87. GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 51 (1961); OPPENHEIM, supra
note 65, at 512.
88. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 512.
89. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4,23 (Apr. 6).
90. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 512.
91. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302(c)(1).
92. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 935-36.
93. WHITE, supra note 87, at 52.
94. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 936-38.
717
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
sons and refugees. 95 A stateless person is one who lacks both the
nationality of the expropriating state and the nationality of any
other state. 96 A refugee or displaced person is an individual who
resides outside his own country but who still bears the national-
ity of that country. 97 Despite the different labels, all of these
persons are in essentially the same position; they lack a forum
where they can seek compensation from their government, and
no government is likely to provide them with the protection and
benefits that come from nationality. 98
U.S. nationals who were Cuban citizens at the time of the
confiscation of their property share the same status as stateless
or displaced persons and refugees under international law.
Without a country to bring a claim on their behalf, these U.S.
nationals lack a forum under international law in which to seek
compensation for their loss. In apparent response to this prob-
lem, the Liberty Act provides these U.S. nationals a cause of ac-
tion in its municipal courts,99 thereby avoiding the espousal re-
quirements of the international tribunal.100 Public international
law supports the U.S. right to create exceptions to the general
principle that a state may not bring an action on behalf of a
nonnational. 101
Moreover, it is a basic principle of international law that a
state may protest the confiscation of its property or the property
of its subjects 102 and may protect its nationals by bringing a case
on their behalf in an international tribunal. 0 3 The state may
also protect itself from injury caused by acts performed within
the territory of a foreign state. 0 4 The injury to the United States
in the present case was Cuba's expropriation of its citizens' prop-
erty,10 5 which transformed many Cuban citizens into refugees. 0 6
The act of transformation by Cuba is ipso facto illegal under in-
95. Id. at 890-91.
96. WHITE, supra note 87, at 52.
97. Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 532, 537 (1986).
98. Id. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 891.
99. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302(c)(1).
100. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 512.
101. WHITE, supra note 87, at 52. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 936-38.
102. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at 72.
103. Lee, supra note 97, at 556.
104. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at 20.
105. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(3)(B)(iii).
106. Id. § 301(3)(iii).
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ternational law. 10 7 Further, where the expropriating state has
inconvenienced or caused a loss to another state by expropriating
the property of its citizens and creates a flood of refugees to
neighboring states, international law recognizes the right of the
neighboring state to refuse to recognize dealings of the expropri-
ating state with the property of the refugees.10 8 Therefore, the
United States, which arguably has been inconvenienced and has
suffered a loss as a result of the Cuban refugee influx, does not
have to recognize under international law Cuba's dealings in
property confiscated from U.S. nationals who were Cuban citi-
zens at the time of the expropriation and who later became refu-
gees only after Cuba confiscated their property. Equity and fun-
damental notions of fairness support ignoring differences such as
the nationality of the person at the time of expropriation where
the situation giving rise to the difference is caused by Cuba's
wrongful expropriations in violation of international law.109
3. Domestic Liability for the Legal Expropriation of
Property Within the Expropriating State
A further conclusion in the Committee's decision is that the
claimant state has no right to attach liability to foreign nationals
for the use of expropriated property in a foreign state where the
use of the property is legal in that foreign state.110 For example,
such a conclusion would invalidate the Liberty Act because a
foreign national could not be held liable for using property con-
fiscated from a U.S. national, where such a use is legal within
Cuba.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law: Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (Restatement (Third)) provides that a state
is responsible for injury under international law when it takes
the property of a national of another state and the taking is not
for a public purpose, is discriminatory, or is unaccompanied by
just compensation."' In addition, the expropriation of property
becomes an international wrong where a foreigner's property is
107. Lee, supra note 97, at 538.
108. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at 20.
109. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
110. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 6.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
712 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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taken in violation of a treaty, where the taking is arbitrary, or
where the expropriating state fails to give adequate compensa-
tion. 12 Cuba has committed an international wrong by its fail-
ure to adequately compensate thousands of U.S. nationals whose
property was confiscated and whose claims were certified by the
Commission. 113 Where a wrongful expropriation or confiscation
has occurred, the expropriating state gains title to the property
by its own internal law, but other states do not have to recognize
such title when the manner of acquisition is contrary to interna-
tional law. 114
In the United States, the Federal Court of Appeals in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, Whitlock & Co. found that Cuba's
confiscation of property is ineffective to transfer title because of
the discriminatory nature of the takings, which violated inter-
national law, 15 thereby becoming an international wrong. The
consequence of a null title is to treat the property as stolen; as a
result, the original owner retains title with the exception of a
subsequent purchaser who purchases without actual or con-
structive notice. 116 The Liberty Act recognizes this exception and
requires knowledge of the trafficking in confiscated property be-
fore imposing civil liability for money damages on a foreign na-
tional who traffics in the property." 7
A foreign national who acquires wrongfully confiscated
property from Cuba and who knowingly purchases, sells, trans-
fers, or otherwise uses the wrongfully confiscated property is
trafficking in stolen property as defined by international law. 118
International law recognizes that a person in possession of prop-
erty which he or she knows is stolen may become liable in dam-
ages to the true owner under an action for conversion or for con-
spiracy "to deprive the true owner of his rights." 19 Thus,
subjecting the foreign national to liability in the United States
112. MANN, supra note 75, at 176; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that failure to pay compensation to a victim of expropriation
constitutes a violation of international law).
113. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr Whitlock & Co., 383 F.2d 166, 183-85 (1967).
114. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at 16.
115. 383 F.2d 166, 183-85 (1967).
116. MANN, supra note 75, at 186.
117. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 4(13)(B).
118. MANN, supra note 75, at 186.
119. Id.
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for withholding, transferring, or using120 the confiscated property
does not violate international law, regardless of whether the
confiscation or use is treated as legal within Cuba.
121
The legality of a taking under the internal law of a state,
where no compensation was paid for the loss of the property, was
rejected as a defense to liability in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
case, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.122 In that
case, the tribunal also rejected the defense that the taking was
for financial, economic, and social concerns and found that even
these worthy objectives did not relieve Iran from its obligation to
compensate under international law. 128 Under the current situa-
tion, the fact that Cuba is willing and able to transfer confiscated
property to foreign nationals, 124 even in the midst of an economic
crisis, does not shield a foreign national from committing an in-
ternational wrong by trafficking in wrongfully confiscated prop-
erty, for "[the] facility in trading in expropriated property is no
reason for ignoring rules of public international law."125
4. Imposition of Liability on Traffickers of Expropriated
Property
The Committee's decision also concludes that a claimant
State has no right to impose or attribute liability to foreign na-
tionals not involved in a confiscation through the creation of li-
ability not linked to the confiscation or unrecognized by interna-
tional law. 126 Consequently, as applied to the Liberty Act, this
conclusion would not permit the United States to impose liability
on persons who traffic in foreign property because such persons
had nothing to do with Cuba's confiscation of the property.
120. EDWARD H. WARREN, TRovER AND CONvERSION, i (1970). Some of the tortious acts
amounting to a conversion include denying a person's title to property, securing, withholding, or trans-
ferring a possession, and altering or using the property.
121. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 84 (discussing the "firmly established [principle] that a
state when charged with a breach of its international obligations cannot in international law validly
plead as a [defense] that it was unable to [fulfill] them because its internal law was defective or con-
tained rules in conflict with international law...").
122. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 fran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 121, 129-30
(1986).
123. Id
124. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(5).
125. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at21.
126. Committee 's Decision, supra note 6, at 6.
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The Committee's decision erred in assuming that a foreign
national not involved in the actual wrongful nationalization of
property is immune from all liability.127 International law does
not support the notion that a foreign citizen may possess, sell,
transfer, or otherwise traffic in wrongfully confiscated property
and not incur liability. As previously mentioned, the confiscation
of property is treated as stolen. 128 Additionally, international
law recognizes that a person in possession of property that they
know is stolen may become liable in damages to the true
owner 129 under an action for conversion or for conspiracy "to de-
prive the true owner of his rights. 130 A foreign national in pos-
session of property stolen from U.S. nationals may be liable for
damages resulting from the conversion of the property. 131 Fur-
thermore, a foreign national who uses, transfers, or benefits
from the stolen property is cooperating with Cuba to deprive
U.S. nationals of their property rights and may be held liable for
damages resulting from this conspiracy. 132 The Liberty Act does
not violate international law by imposing liability on persons
who knowingly possess wrongfully confiscated property or coop-
erate with the Cuban government in depriving U.S. nationals of
their right to compensation.
5. The Measure of Damages For Wrongful Expropriation
The Committee further concluded that a state may not im-
pose damages in an amount "greater than the effective dam-
ages," which resulted from the wrongful expropriation, plus in-
terest.133 Thus, the Committee believes the Liberty Act's calcu-
lation of damages for the confiscated property exceeds the maxi-
mum amount allowed under international law.
A claim for compensation is often the only claim available to
a party where restitution is physically impossible because the
object is lost or destroyed 134 or because the expropriating party
has no interest in returning the property. The issue concerning
127. MANN, supra note 75, at 186.
128. Id
129. Id




134. WORTLEY, supra note 78, at 94.
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which standard of compensation to apply, full or partial, has
bred many articles and arguments. 135 Perhaps the debate can be
traced back to the Chorzow Factory case, decided in 1928 by the
Permanent International Court of Justice. 136 There, the Court,
in holding the expropriation of German property by Poland to be
illegal, stated that "reparation [for the illegal act] must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have ex-
isted if that act had not been committed."'137 According to the
Court, this translated into a payment of restitution in kind, or of
a sum equivalent to it.138 The United States entered the melee
with the infamous phrase, "prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation," used by Secretary of State Hull in 1938 to describe
the compensation required from Mexico for its expropriation of
land owned by U.S. nationals. 139 Whether this formula repre-
sents the standard under customary international law has been
a continuing source of controversy.14 The Restatement (Third)
provides that a taking of property is wrongful under interna-
135. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Com-
pensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW.
639, 659 (1987); see also Monroe Leigh, Nationalization-Standard of Compensation-"Going Con-
cern" Value, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 454, 455-56 (1984); RICHARD B. LiLLICH, THE VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 117-29 (1972).
136. Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
137. Id at 47.
138. Id.
139. Note of Secretary of State Hull, Aug. 22, 1938, (Mexico-U.S.) 19 Dep't. of State Press Re-
leases, No. 465, Aug. 27, 1938, at 140 [hereinafter Hull Formula]. The U.S. Congress adopted the Hull
formula as the standard of compensation required before an expropriating state can receive a loan from
the Inter-American Development Bank. Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22 U.S.C.A. § 283(r).
However, the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 892 (2d Cir.
1981), refused to accept the Hull formula, instead finding that international law required the payment
of either "appropriate" or "full" compensation.
140. M.H. Mendelson, Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 414,
414-15 (1985). The controversy was revived again during the debates in 1984 over the proposed draft
of Section 712 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Revised), which states the standard as "just compensation." Id. Professor Oscar Schachter ar-
gued that, although the United States has maintained "just compensation" means prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation, this formula has not been accepted as the international law standard and
should not be considered as such. Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM J. INT'L
L. 121, 122 (1984). Professor Schachter instead suggested that "just compensation" should be replaced
with the more flexible standard of "appropriate compensation" primarily because the Hull formula is
not found in the decisions of international tribunals, and thus, is not a "general rule of law." Id. at 122-
24. But see Mendelson, supra (arguing that, although the decisions of international tribunals do not
state the Hull formula literally, they do require full compensation, and leave no room for a flexible
standard).
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tional law when unaccompanied by "just" compensation.14 1
Compensation is "just" when, "in the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances," it is equivalent to the fair market value of the
property taken, and is paid, with interest, within a reasonable
time after the expropriation. 42 The comments to the Restate-
ment (Third) recognize that the United States has consistently
maintained that "just" compensation is defined as "prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation."'14 3
The standard of compensation is important, of course, be-
cause it determines how the expropriated property should be
valued (i.e., the quantification of the property). 44 The debate in
this area has largely focused on whether valuation should be
based solely on the "net book value" of an asset or whether the
"going concern value," including contractual rights, future pros-
pects, and lost profits, should be included in the computation. 4 5
While this issue has not been debated nearly as much as the
standard of compensation, 46 its resolution remains important,
particularly in light of the amount of U.S. businesses confiscated
by the Cuban government.147
Although a comprehensive examination of the valuation
methods is best left to accounting articles, 43 a brief examination
of the decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal provides some
helpful insight. As of 1987, when computing the fair market
value of the business, the tribunal's method of valuation of the
property interest consistently included future profits, as well as
present obligations. 149 At least one decision even included the
element of good will in valuing the going concern of a business. 150
At the same time, there had been no valuation based solely on
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 111, § 712.
142. Id. See REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 166, (1986).
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 111, cmt. c. For the view that the Restatement "reaffirm-
ed" the Hull formula, see Norton,supra note 70, at 474.
144. Thomas R. Stauffer, Valuation of Assets in International Takings, 17 ENERGY L.J. 459
(1996).
145. Browcr, supra note 135, at 664-68.
146. Id. at 664-65.
147. For a list of American businesses with certified claims, see Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alter-
native Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against
Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 683 app. A (1996).
148. See Stauffer, supra note 144, at 459, 461.
149. Brower, supra note 135, at 666.
150. Leigh, supra note 135, at 455-56.
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the net book value of a confiscated enterprise.15'
Since 1959, Cuba has confiscated the property of thousands
of U.S. nationals and millions of its own citizens.15 2 Some
prominent U.S. companies with certified claims include Coca-
Cola ($27,526,239.00), Texaco ($50,081,110.00), and Colgate-
Palmolive ($14,507,935.00). 153 Much of the property confiscated
from these companies and other U.S. nationals is lost, destroyed,
or has simply deteriorated. In addition, Cuba apparently has no
interest in returning the confiscated property to these U.S. na-
tionals, as it is receiving financial benefit from the transfer of
confiscated property and assets to foreign nationals instead.
15 4
As a result, Cuba has not settled with or compensated U.S. na-
tionals for their loss. 155 In light of these facts and the recent
holdings of international tribunals, 15 6 the award of full compen-
sation, including, where applicable, going concern, is appropriate
for Cuba's expropriation of the property of U.S. nationals.
Accordingly, the Liberty Act provides for the award of money
damages measured in the amount which is the greater of: 1) the
amount, if any, certified by the Commission, plus interest; 5 7 2)
under Section 303(a)(2), the amount determined by a court ap-
pointed special master; or 3) the fair market value of the prop-
erty, calculated as the greater of either the current value of the
property 58 or the value of the property when confiscated, plus
interest. 159 In addition, a person who traffics in confiscated
property certified under the Commission, or who continues to
151. Brower, supra note 135, at 666.
152. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(3)(B)(i)-(ii). See RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-29 (1972). There are reportedly 5911 certified
claims of expropriation of U.S. property, and there are believed to be many more. State Department
Regular News Briefing Speaker's List: Nicholas Burns, State Department Spokesperson, POLITICAL
TRANSCRIPTS BY FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, Sept. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL
12719936 [hereinafter State Department].
153. Travieso-Diaz,supra note 147, at app. A.
154. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(5), (6).
155. See State Department, supra note 152; see also LILLICH, supra note 150, at 117-29.
156. Brower, supra note 135, at 664; Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the
Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 475
(1991).
157. The Foreign Claims Commission, in determining the claims of U.S. nationals, used the basis
of valuation "most appropriate to the property and equitable to the claimant," including fair market
value, book value, going concern value, and cost of replacement. Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22
U.S.C.A. § 1643(b) (1996).
158. For the sake of argument, it is assumed the "current value of the property" includes going
concern, i.e., contractual rights, future prospects, and good will.
159. Liberty Act, supra note 1, §§ 302(a)(1), 303(a)(2).
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traffic in such property after receiving notice from a U.S. na-
tional, will be liable for triple the amount of damages.' 60 Al-
though The Restatement (Third) makes no mention of treble
damages, it does not completely rule out the possibility. A
measure of damages other than the fair market value of property
may be used where exceptional circumstances are present. 161
A U.S. national's claim certified by the Commission gives in-
creased notice to the foreign national that the property was con-
fiscated from a U.S. national. A foreign national who continues
to traffic in the property with concrete knowledge of the wrongful
expropriation is acting in willful and wanton defiance of inter-
national law and should be subject to punitive damages for such
conduct. 162 In essence, exceptional circumstances may be pres-
ent under such a scenario.
6. Due Process in the Domestic Courts of the Claimant
State.
The Committee's decision also concluded that a claimant
state may not deprive a foreign national of due process of law to
contest claims that may affect his property. 63 The Committee,
thus, necessarily found that foreign nationals are denied due
process of law in U.S. district courts for actions brought against
them by U.S. nationals acting under the Liberty Act.
A foreign national, however, is not denied the opportunity to
contest a U.S. national's claim under the Liberty Act.16 4 Actions
under the Act are subject to the same procedural requirements
as provided in Title 28 of the U.S. Code and the rules of the fed-
eral courts, to the same extent such rules and provisions apply to
federal action under Section 1331 of Title 28.165 In addition, U.S.
nationals must prove ownership of the property, unless the claim
is already certified by the Commission. 66 The U.S. Department
of State has further established the Helms-Burton Implementa-
160. Id § 302(a)(3)(C)(ii).
161. RESTATEMENT (TIFRD), supra note 111, § 712, cmt. d.
162. Punitive damages are, at least theoretically, available to the victim of an expropriation.
Brower, supra note 135, at 659.
163. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 7.
164. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 302(c)(l)-(2).
165. Id. § 302(c)(1).
166. Id. § 303(a)(l)-(2).
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tion Unit, which collects and analyzes any information regarding
claims of confiscation of a U.S. national's property by the Cuban
government or the trafficking of such property.16 7 A foreign na-
tional is not deprived of due process of law in U.S. courts and
may effectively contest the claim of a U.S. national to the prop-
erty under its possession.
B. Extraterritoriality and the Limits Imposed by
International Law on the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The Committee's decision states the conclusion that a state
may not exercise jurisdiction over acts of "trafficking" abroad by
foreign nationals "unless specific conditions are fulfilled which
do not appear to be satisfied in this situation."'16 8 In addition, the
Committee finds that a prescribing state does not have the right
to exercise jurisdiction over acts of trafficking abroad by foreign
nationals where neither the foreign national nor the conduct in
question has any connection with its territory and where there is
no apparent connection between such conduct and the protection
of the prescribing state's essential sovereign interest.169 Under
the Committee's rationale, the United States does not have ju-
risdiction over the trafficking of property by foreign nationals in
Cuba because the trafficking occurred within Cuba and is not
connected to the protection of any sovereign interest of the
United States.
In most instances, a state has jurisdiction over persons and
things within its territory; 170 this concept of "[t]erritoriality" is
the "primary basis for [a state's] jurisdiction,"17 1 and a state's
jurisdiction cannot generally be exercised outside its territory,
unless an exception exists under customary international law.
172
The principle of territoriality, however, is not easy to apply, es-
pecially when establishing jurisdiction based on whether a par-
ticular act occurred or "had effects" within the territory of a
state.178 When dealing with criminal acts, Oppenheim questions
"whether states have a right to exercise jurisdiction over acts of
167. State Department, supra note 152.
168. Committee's Decision, supra note 6, at 8.
169. Id.
170. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 458.
171. Id.
172. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
173. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 458.
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foreigners committed in foreign countries ..." and concludes that
"it is a matter for determination in each case whether a direct
and substantial connection exists which is sufficient to justify a
state treating as criminal the conduct of aliens taking place
within the area of another state's sovereign authority.' 1 74
There are several recognized exceptions to the principle of
territoriality. 175 Two are relevant to the present case. The first
is the exception that the principle of territoriality does not apply
to acts committed abroad which threaten the safety of a state,
including its political or military security. 176 Before a state is
justified in exercising jurisdiction in self-defense, the act must be
a serious one and cannot merely violate state policy. 177 The sec-
ond exception, often represented by the United States, is that
states have the right to exercise jurisdiction over acts committed
abroad which have or are intended to have an "effect" within
their territory. 178
The "effects principle" is controversial; several states allege
it is not in conformity with international law and it is an inva-
sion of their sovereignty. 7 9 In particular, this argument has fre-
quently been made against the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws, 180 which some U.S. courts have justified by
using the effects principle as a basis for jurisdiction.'18 The
United States, however, is not alone, because several European
nations 182 and the European Economic Community' 83 have also
applied the effects principle as a basis for the extraterritorial
application of their laws. 8 4 In addition, the effects principle has
been recognized and applied by the Permanent Court of Interna-
174. Id. at 467-68.
175. Id. at 468-73.
176. Id. at 470-71. The United States has apparently taken this position in arguing that the con-
troversy over the Liberty Act should not be taken to the World Trade Organization. World Trade Or-
ganization to Arbitrate Dispute on US. Law, DEUTSCHE PRESSEE-AGENTUi, Nov. 20, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
177. OPPENIEIM, supra note 65, at 471.
178. Id. at 472; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11l, § 402(1)(c), cmt. b.
179. Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHiO ST. L.J. 883, 886-87 (1984).
180. Id.
181. Second Circuit of the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945), used the effects principle as a basis for the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law.
182. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 179, at 887.
183. Id. at 887.
184. Id.
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tional Justice in the Lotus case. 185 The Restatement (Third) also
recognizes the principle, providing that a "state has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to (1) conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have a substantial effect within its
territory ... "186 The Restatement (Second) of the Law (Restate-
ment (Second)) defined this conduct and its effect as one that is
recognized as a crime or tort in states with "reasonably devel-
oped legal systems." 87 Section 403 of the Restatement (Third),
however, adds the element of reasonableness to the equation and
lists several factors a court should evaluate before finding the
exercise of jurisdiction based on the effects principle to be rea-
sonable.'l 8 Some of these factors include: "the extent to which the
activity takes place within the regulating state or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating
state," 8 9 "the importance of regulation to the international po-
litical, legal or economic system,"'190 and "the character of the ac-
tivity to be regulated ....
The Liberty Act itself specifically states the effects principle
as an apparent justification for the Act's extraterritorial juris-
diction. 192 The questions which must be resolved are whether
the trafficking of the expropriated property of U.S. nationals is
conduct that is recognized as either a crime or a tort under the
legal system of most nations, whether such conduct has a sub-
stantial effect within the United States, and whether such an
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. As previously discussed,
international law does not require that a claimant state recog-
nize title to property wrongfully expropriated from its nation-
als.193 Such property is considered stolen, and a person in pos-
session of it may be liable for the tort of conversion or for
conspiracy. 9 4 The possession by foreign nationals of property
considered stolen from U.S. nationals under international law is,
therefore, properly characterized as tortious conduct. Applying
185. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 10, at 19, 31.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 111, § 402(1)(c).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
18(a) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
188. RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note I 11, § 403.
189. Id. § 403(2)(a).
190. Id § 403(2)(e).
191. Id. § 403(2)(c).
192. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(11).
193. WORnEY, supra note 78, at 16.
194. MANN, supra note 75, at 186.
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the Restatement (Second) leads to the conclusion that this tor-
tious conduct has a substantial effect in the United States under
the effects doctrine. 195 Moreover, the trafficking of the confis-
cated property substantially affects the United States in that it
impedes efforts to return the property to its original owners.1 96
Thus, trafficking impedes the efforts by thousands of U.S. na-
tionals to recover the millions of dollars in losses suffered from
the wrongful expropriation of their property. This conduct out-
side the United States by foreign nationals has a substantial
economic effect on U.S. nationals and justifies the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. law designed to reduce the wrongful con-
duct.
V. CONCLUSION
The Committee concluded that the Liberty Act was not in
conformity with international law. Nevertheless, it appears that
the Committee's rationale and conclusions failed to overcome the
Liberty Act's presumption of validity. The U.S. adoption of the
historically international claim of expropriation into its munici-
pal law system is within the confines of international law, par-
ticularly in light of the lack of adequate remedies available to
U.S. nationals with claims against Cuba. Similarly, extending
the right to bring such a claim in U.S. courts to its nationals,
who were citizens at the time of the expropriation, is supported
by international law because of the lack of a forum in which
these U.S. nationals have to bring their claims.
The legality of expropriation is not a defense to liability
where the confiscation of the property by the foreign state was
arbitrary or without adequate compensation, and therefore, in
violation of international law. The Committee erred in assuming
that a foreign national not involved in the expropriation is im-
mune from all liability. International law does not support the
notion that a foreign national may traffic in confiscated property,
as defined by the Liberty Act, and not be held liable.
The standard of damages to be paid for a wrongful expro-
priation has generated much debate. However, the recent sup-
port in international tribunals for full compensation, including
195. RESTATEMENT(SECOND), supra note 187, § 18(a).
196. Liberty Act, supra note 1, § 301(7).
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the going concern value, coupled with the unique situation of the
Cuban expropriations, including the present number of outstand-
ing expropriation claims, dictates the payment of full compensa-
tion as provided for under the Liberty Act. Foreign nationals
may contest claims against them and are not deprived of due
process of law in the courts of the United States.
Finally, the "effects principle," although controversial, is in-
ternationally recognized as a valid exception to the general rule
of territoriality. The act by a foreign national of trafficking in
confiscated property is recognized as tortious conduct, and such
conduct has a substantial economic effect in the United States.
The extra-territorial application of the Liberty Act, through the
effects principle exception, is not unreasonable in light of the
conduct involved, its effect in the United States, and the impor-
tance of the regulation of such conduct in the international po-
litical, legal, and economic system. The justifications and con-
clusions reached above weigh in favor of interpreting the Act in
harmony with international law.
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